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Abstract 
This paper deals with the place of narrative, that is, storytelling, in public deliberation. A distinction is 
made between weak and strong conceptions of narrative. According to the weak one, storytelling is but 
one rhetorical device among others with which social actors produce and convey meaning. In contrast, the 
strong conception holds that narrative is necessary to communicate, and argue, about topics such as the 
human experience of time, collective identities and the moral and ethical validity of values. The upshot of 
this idea is that storytelling should be a necessary component of any ideal of public deliberation. Contrary 
to recent work by deliberative theorists, who tend to adopt the weak conception of narrative, the author 
argues for embracing the strong one. The main contention of this article is that stories not only have a 
legitimate place in deliberation, but are even necessary to formulate certain arguments in the ﬁ rst place; 
for instance, arguments drawing on historical experience. This claim, namely that narrative is constitutive 
of certain arguments, in the sense that, without it, said reasons cannot be articulated, is illustrated by 
deliberative theory’s own narrative underpinnings. Finally, certain possible objections against the strong 
conception of narrative are dispelled.
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¿Deliberación narrativa?
Acerca de la necesidad de contar historias en la deliberación pública
Resumen 
Este artículo aborda el papel de las narraciones en la deliberación pública. Se diferenciará entre una 
concepción débil y otra fuerte de las mismas. La primera ve el contar historias como un recurso retórico 
entre otros muchos con el que los actores sociales crean sentido y se comunican, mientras que la segunda 
concibe las narraciones como necesarias para la comunicación y el debate sobre temas tales como la 
experiencia del tiempo, las identidades colectivas o la validez moral y ética de los valores. El corolario de 
esta idea es que las narraciones deben ser elementos esenciales de todo ideal de deliberación. En contra 
de las posturas recientes de un buen número de teóricos deliberativos, quienes tienden a adoptar una 
concepción débil de las narraciones, se argumentará la idoneidad de asumir una concepción fuerte de 
las mismas. La principal tesis de este trabajo es, por tanto, que las narraciones no solo tienen un papel 
legítimo en la deliberación, sino que resultan indispensables para formular determinados argumentos en 
primera instancia; por ejemplo, aquéllos que beben de la experiencia histórica. La idea de que las historias 
son constitutivas de determinados argumentos, en el sentido de que sin las mismas éstos no podrían 
ser formulados, se ilustrará poniendo de relieve el propio sustrato narrativo de la teoría deliberativa. 
Finalmente, se despejarán ciertas posibles objeciones a la concepción fuerte de las narraciones. 
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Introduction
Deliberative democracy gained currency in the 1980s and 1990s as a normative theory 
intended to consolidate existing liberal democracies. Since then, it has not only attracted 
much academic debate, but also inspired political reforms and experimentation with 
different institutional innovations. In this regard, Chambers noted already in 2003 that 
deliberative democratic theory had “moved beyond the ‘theoretical statement’ and into 
the ‘working theory’ stage” (Chambers, 2003: 307). This notwithstanding, the concept 
of deliberation has remained a matter of debate. 
Bächtiger et al. (2010) have tried to introduce some order into this debate by 
distinguishing between two concepts of deliberation, which they simply label “type I” 
and “type II.” According to this distinction, type I conceptions regard deliberation as “a 
systematic process wherein actors tell the truth, justify their propositions extensively, 
and are willing to yield to the force of the better argument” (Bächtiger et al, 2010: 
33). This concept of deliberation has attracted much criticism, however. Among other 
things, it has been criticised for undermining political equality, on the basis that it 
privileges certain social groups –typically citizens with higher levels of education– 
who are better at articulating abstract arguments and framing them in terms of the 
hegemonic conception of the common good than other groups, which furthermore, are 
usually already underrepresented politically (Sanders, 1997; Young, 2001). Besides, 
such a concept of deliberation has been considered too rationalistic and thin to be 
motivationally efﬁ cacious, as it tends to exclude emotional talk, storytelling and other 
forms of communication capable of arousing emotions and processes of identiﬁ cation 
and empathy (Abizadeh, 2007). Interestingly, these and further criticisms1 have 
contributed not so much to abandoning deliberative theory altogether, but to its revision 
along the lines of type II deliberation, as well as to making this type II conception more 
popular among political scientists. 
1  In this regard, see Bächtiger et al. (2010) and Yack (2006). For more extensive discussions, 
see Fontana et al. (2004) and Steiner (2012). 
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Quoting Warren (2007), type II deliberation is deﬁ ned by Bächtiger et al. (2010: 33) 
as “all activities that function as communicative inﬂ uence under conditions of conﬂ ict.” 
As such, deliberation involves not only the giving and taking of arguments, but also 
other forms of communication, such as storytelling, the giving of testimony, the use of 
humour, sarcasm, emotional communication, and so on. At its limits, one can go as far 
as to claim, with Young (2010: 688), that demonstrations, cartoons, musical works, and 
so forth, also function as communicative inﬂ uences under conditions of conﬂ ict and 
thus should be regarded as contributing to public deliberation. A number of authors 
have embraced one version or another of type II deliberation, from Habermas (1992) 
and Dryzek (2010) to Chambers (2009) and Parkinson and Mansbridge (2013), or Ibarra 
Güell (2011), among others. These different approaches –as stressed by Bächtiger et al. 
(2010: 42)– do not constitute a “fully coherent program,” but they do at least form “a 
distinguishable approach in deliberative theory.” 
However, there are some aspects of type II deliberation that are still under-theorised 
and in need of further elaboration. This is the case of the recognition of storytelling 
as a legitimate practice within public deliberation. Although previous studies have 
addressed this topic explicitly (e.g. Boswell, 2013; Polletta and Lee, 2006; Young, 
2002), there are still further issues that need to be clariﬁ ed. In particular, there are 
at least two understandings of the concept of narrative: a weak one, which is clearly 
compatible with deliberative theory, and a strong one, which has been interpreted, as 
by Rorty (1989), as challenging some of the basic tenets of deliberative democracy. 
So, it is far from clear whether storytelling and narrative forms of communication can 
consistently be integrated into the concept of deliberation or whether this is a move that 
will eventually undermine the whole theoretical ediﬁ ce of deliberative theory. 
In this article I will pursue this question. Drawing on a broader range of authors 
than those usually considered by deliberative democrats, I distinguish between weak 
and strong conceptions of narrative, and use this distinction to make sense of the main 
theoretical positions in the debate about narrative’s place in deliberation. According 
to the weak conception, storytelling is but one rhetorical device among others with 
which social actors produce and convey meaning. In contrast, the strong understanding 
of narrative holds that storytelling is unavoidable when it comes to, for example, 
expressing the human experience of time or defending the moral or ethical validity 
of values. The upshot of this idea is that narrative should be a necessary component 
of any ideal of public deliberation. Contrary to recent work by deliberative theorists, 
who tend to adopt, explicitly or implicitly, the weak conception of narrative, I argue for 
embracing the strong one. In my view, storytelling not only has a legitimate place in 
deliberation, but it is also necessary to formulate certain arguments in the ﬁ rst place; for 
example, arguments drawing on historical experience. This, I believe, can be illustrated 
by deliberative theory’s own narrative underpinnings. Besides, to strengthen my case 
for the strong conception of narrative, I discuss Rorty’s interpretation of this strong 
concept of storytelling and dispel some objections against deliberative theory that can 
be drawn from it. 
The argument unfolds in seven sections. In the ﬁ rst one, I brieﬂ y introduce the 
epistemic justiﬁ cation of deliberative democracy, for the arguments put forward by 
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these epistemic accounts are precisely what is at stake in debates about narrative and 
deliberation. In the second section the weak notion of narrative is presented, which is 
the form that has usually been contemplated by deliberative theorists. It is argued that 
it is compatible with deliberative democracy, at least from a theoretical perspective. 
With regard to the stronger conception, presented in the third section, it has been used 
to undermine arguments for the epistemic dimension of deliberative democracy, thus 
challenging central ideas of deliberative theory. These arguments are spelled out in 
section four, although in the next section I shall contend that this speciﬁ c interpretation 
rests on shaky logical and conceptual grounds. Furthermore, this discussion will 
help to highlight the narrative underpinnings of deliberative theory itself, which are 
reconstructed in section six. This, I conclude, should make plausible the claim that 
narratives are not only compatible with deliberative democracy and its epistemic 
justiﬁ cation, but also that they are necessary in public deliberation, for without narrative 
elements certain arguments cannot be articulated in the ﬁ rst place.2 
1. The Epistemic Justiﬁ cation of Deliberative Democracy 
For a number of deliberative theorists (e.g. Estlund, 2009; Habermas, 2006; Lafont, 
2006; Martí, 2006), deliberative democracy can be justiﬁ ed in epistemic terms, and some 
of them even go as far as to argue that this epistemic conception “becomes unavoidable 
for deliberative democrats” altogether (Martí, 2006: 28; emphasis added). While the 
exact contours of this epistemic conception differ depending on the author, the main 
idea, common to most of them, is that any consistent defence of deliberative democracy 
has to account among other things for why democracy ought to be deliberative (Lafont, 
2006). It should be so, according to this argument, because deliberation is a decision-
making procedure which is more likely to yield “substantively correct outcomes (i.e., 
just, efﬁ cient, good, etc.)” (Lafont, 2006: 7) than other democratic decision-making 
procedures. In more limited terms, others argue that there are good reasons to believe 
that deliberation is at least more likely to produce “robust” decisions by reducing 
“error” (Bohman, 2007). 
The reasons for these beliefs are varied. Public deliberation is thought to fulﬁ l a 
number of functions: to encourage the expression of all relevant interests, concerns and 
preferences on a speciﬁ c topic, as well as the intensity with which these preferences are 
held; to increase the pool of available information; to make political manipulation more 
difﬁ cult; to promote the critical examination of arguments and of their premises; to 
clarify the exact content of a political controversy and its different dimensions; to order 
transitively the political preferences of the participants. In sum, public deliberation 
2  One further caveat might be necessary. When scholars speak of storytelling, they often 
refer, though usually implicitly, to personal stories. The fact that storytelling is sometimes 
discussed in conjunction with testimony attests to this. However, it is also true that discussions 
of the relation between narrative and deliberation normally pretend to range wider, including not 
only personal narrative, but also “political narrative” more generally (Young, 2002: 72). This 
paper concentrates on this broader understanding of storytelling. 
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is said to “mobilize relevant topics and claims, promote the critical evaluation of 
contributions, and lead to rationally motivated yes or no reactions” (Habermas, 2006: 
413), which in turn grounds “[t]he presumption of reasonable outcomes”. 
Empirical research has produced signiﬁ cant evidence to support the tenet that 
deliberation has an epistemic edge. In this regard, at least three mechanisms operate 
within public deliberation giving it an epistemic dimension (Engelken-Jorge, 2014: 86-
88). First, participants are forced by deliberation to attend to the interests, values and 
opinions put forward by other interlocutors, in this way encouraging the formulation 
of shared interests and shared perspectives. Second, deliberation favours the critical 
scrutiny and assessment of the arguments and statements voiced by the participants in 
a deliberative process, which contributes to eliminating ambiguities, vagueness and 
fallacies from public debate. Third, by encouraging mutual communication, deliberation 
promotes the sharing of factual information. Deliberation, then, contributes to the 
development of political preferences that tend to accommodate the interests and values 
of other citizens, are more likely to be based on collectively accepted arguments and 
forms of reasoning, and tend to rest on a greater pool of factual information. These three 
aspects are supposed to grant deliberation an epistemic edge over other democratic 
decision-making procedures, which in turn grounds the claim that democracy should 
be deliberative. 
As we shall see in the next sections, there are two meanings of narrative in the 
scholarly literature: one of them can easily be reconciled with this epistemic edge of 
deliberation; the other one, however, has been interpreted as posing a greater challenge.3 
2. The Weak Conception of Narrative 
Essentially, the main difference between weak and strong conceptions of narrative lies 
in the theoretical work that one wants the concept of narrative to do. In both cases, 
however, a narrative or story can be deﬁ ned, rather conventionally, as “a description, 
either true or imagined, of a connected series of events.”4 In more sophisticated 
terms, we might deﬁ ne narratives as “constellations of relationships (connected parts) 
embedded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment” (Somers, 1994: 616). 
Stories, then, are a speciﬁ c form of arranging and conveying information, as well as 
producing meaning, which is principally characterised by connecting different events 
together and turning them into episodes of a broader interrelated sequence of events. As 
3  Many of the arguments made in the following two sections are also advanced in the recent 
literature on political rhetoric (Garsten, 2011). Here, however, I will draw on work in social 
theory, which I favour essentially because in this sociological literature the difference between 
weak and strong conceptions of narrative, which I deem crucial to make sense of current debates 
on deliberation and storytelling, becomes more evident. 
4  This deﬁ nition of the term story has been taken from the Cambridge Online Dictionary, 
consulted 25th August 2014. Narrative, for its part, is deﬁ ned as “a story or a description of a 
series of events” –hence, both concepts can be taken as synonyms. 
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such, narratives might range from personal stories and everyday anecdotes to historical 
accounts of long-term macro processes.
The weak conception of narrative simply takes stories as one rhetorical device 
among others through which actors can produce and convey meaning. This is a rather 
common way of seeing storytelling.5 The way the debate about narrative’s place in 
deliberation is usually framed, for example, already suggests a weak conception of 
narrative. The central question of this debate, namely, whether or not storytelling should 
be granted a place in deliberation (cf. Bächtiger et al., 2010: 55-56; Dryzeck, 2000: 48; 
Neblo, 2007: 533-534; Steiner, 2012: 57-87), already implies that it would make sense 
to conceive of deliberation as devoid of narrative elements –an idea that the strong 
conception of narrative would certainly reject. Even the article that comes closer to 
the strong conception of narrative in the last years, the one by Boswell (2013), fails to 
make the full transition from the weak to the strong concept of storytelling. This author 
rightly pinpoints the value of narrative and goes as far as to argue that storytelling is a 
“crucial mechanism by which people actually make sense of and communicate about 
political issues” (Boswell, 2013: 623). Therefore, he argues, it should be taken into 
account when envisaging and studying deliberative systems at a macro scale. Thus he 
fails to take the ﬁ nal step and acknowledge, as the strong conception of narrative would 
have it, that narrative is actually unavoidable when it comes to communication about 
issues such as values, identities and the experience of time, both in deliberative systems 
and face-to-face interactions. 
Be that as it may, this weak conception of storytelling can easily be integrated into 
a deliberative framework. For one thing, narratives can be regarded as a particularly 
efﬁ cient device with which to disseminate certain claims and ideas. For whatever reason, 
it seems that narratives resonate better with the way most people communicate, imagine 
and explain the world than abstract forms of reasoning (Tilly, 2002). Narratives, in this 
regard, contribute to disseminating ideas and information in an accessible form. Thus, 
they might facilitate the integration of individuals less capable of arguing in abstract 
terms into a deliberative system (Sanders, 1997; Young, 2001). Furthermore, they have 
the potential to make systems of distributed deliberation more cohesive, as stories 
travel easily across deliberative sites and facilitate communication between people with 
different degrees of expertise and knowledge (Boswell, 2013). Moreover, storytelling 
might help to build trust, promote mutual recognition and establish credibility; it might 
also favour less agonistic forms of interaction (Polletta and Lee, 2006; Steiner, 2012: 
57–64). 
Certainly, there are also shortcomings associated with narratives. Their frequent 
ambiguity and openness to interpretation can be seen as undermining conceptual 
clarity and rigour, which are precisely two key elements of the epistemic dimension 
5  Ironically, one of the ﬁ rst treatments of the place of narrative in deliberation comes closer 
to the strong conception of storytelling than to the weak one. I am referring to Young (2002; 
see in particular p. 75). Given that Young (2002: 71) herself acknowledged her debt to other 
scholars in her treatment of narrative, I will not concentrate on her work in this paper. Rather, I 
will pay attention to the sociological literature (see also footnote 3). 
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of deliberation (Niemeyer, 2011). The point, however, is that storytelling, in this 
weak sense, does not preclude its critical examination; that is, in public deliberation, 
narratives can be criticised for being too ambiguous, for disregarding crucial facts, 
manipulating information or establishing misleading connections between events. This 
is very much the same as with arguments, which can be fallacious, illogical, based on 
wrong or partial information, and so on. This is not a problem as long as deliberation 
exhibits a self-correcting dynamic. 
The point, then, is that narratives understood in the weak sense are not conceptually 
incompatible with deliberative democracy. In fact, they might be instrumental in 
disseminating certain ideas and achieving some ends which are beneﬁ cial to public 
deliberation. Frequently, however, storytelling might also undermine deliberation. 
Sorting out when this is the case is, however, an empirical question –it is much more 
related to how people use stories than to the concept of story itself. On a theoretical 
level, then, one can only conclude that narratives, in this weak sense, can have a place 
in deliberative theory without this being inconsistent with the theoretical framework of 
deliberative democracy. 
3. The Strong Conception of Narrative
As afﬁ rmed earlier, weak and strong conceptions deﬁ ne narrative in similar terms. 
Their main difference lies not so much in how they distinguish narratives from other 
rhetorical forms, but in the theoretical signiﬁ cance they attribute to them. The starting 
idea of this strong conception is rather widespread. It argues that culture is essentially 
shaped by shared narratives. Alexander (2004: 568) encapsulates this tenet when he 
states that “[c]ulture is less toolkit than storybook”. This idea of culture as storybook 
is related to what Somers (1994: 613-614) calls “ontological narrativity”: “social life is 
itself storied … people are guided to act in certain ways, and not others, on the basis of 
the projections, expectations, and memories derived from a multiplicity but ultimately 
limited repertoire of available social, public, and cultural narratives.” Similarly, Fisher 
(1984), drawing on MacIntyre, elevates storytelling to a human communication 
paradigm, according to which “humans are essentially storytellers,”, and “the world is 
a set of stories” (Fisher, 1984: 7-8).6
Notwithstanding expressions such as “ontological narrativity,” this conception 
of stories is essentially an empirical notion through which social scientists try to 
characterise the symbolic world in which social actors live. Thus, according to this 
account, it is ultimately an empirical fact that the social world is structured by shared 
6  The fact that the strong conception of narrative is “widespread,” as I said, does not mean that 
there is a single and agreed upon notion of culture. Indeed, culture has been variously conceived 
of as toolkit (Swidler, 1986), webs of signiﬁ cance (Geertz, 1973), storybook (Alexander, 2004) 
or as composed of schemes, among other things (for an overview of the plurality of ways in 
which culture can be conceptualized, see Wuthnow, 1992). Since the point here is not to deﬁ ne 
what culture really is, but to introduce the strong conception of narrative, I will leave open the 
issue of how these different notions of culture relate to the strong image of narrative. 
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narratives. What it says is, essentially, that research systematically shows that stories 
play a key role in a number of social phenomena, so we have good reasons to generalise 
this conclusion and say things like “social life is itself storied” (Somers, 1994: 613-
614) or “humans are essentially storytellers” (Fisher, 1984: 7). 
However, scholars have sought to go beyond empirical observation, trying to account 
for the pervasiveness of narrative.7 The work of Ricoeur has been highly inﬂ uential, as 
it points to what is probably narrative’s most distinctive feature, namely its capacity to 
grasp the experience of time. For this philosopher, the very structure of stories, that is, 
their emplotment, combines a chronological dimension as well as a “conﬁ gurational 
dimension,” which turns isolated events into ordered, interconnected episodes, in 
this way creating “signiﬁ cant wholes” (Ricoeur, 1979: 24). As such, narrative brings 
“the mode of being which we call temporality … to language” (Ricoeur, 1979: 17). 
Similarly, Somers (1998: 767) contends that “the world is made up of things that are 
constituted through temporal and spatial relationships and thus must be represented in 
relational and narrative terms” (her emphasis). Certainly, other scholars have argued 
that other methodological concepts, such as general laws or causal mechanisms,8 also 
serve to represent, and make sense of, history, that is, the human experience of time. 
The point is, however, that a number of historical processes and events only happen 
once or very rarely and thus are not amenable to being elucidated and communicated 
through non-narrative forms of rhetoric. In short, according to the strong conception of 
narrative, the symbolic processing of history requires storytelling. 
Other scholars have pointed out additional features of narrative, although they can 
be considered of secondary importance in this context. This is not because they are 
irrelevant tout court, but because there are other rhetorical forms of expression that 
can do the same job. For example, stories are said to arouse emotions and especially 
feelings of identiﬁ cation in a way that abstract reasoning cannot (Fisher, 1984: 9) –but 
it is also true that emotions can also be aroused by, say, poetry or the (non-narrative) 
description of an injustice. Hence, one cannot claim that storytelling is indispensable 
in public deliberation because of its emotion-arousing ability. Having said this, I am 
willing to concede that narrative’s ability to arouse emotions enhances the importance 
of storytelling for public deliberation. For instance, scholars usually highlight a third 
feature of narrative, namely its performative dimension, which relies upon narrative’s 
capacity to express the experience of time and to stir emotions, in particular feelings 
of identiﬁ cation. By telling stories, people not only communicate, but also sometimes 
create things. For example, they create collective identities by recounting (or inventing) 
past events and allegedly shared traditions that justify group boundaries, with which 
7  This, admittedly, has created some ambiguity, as it makes the strong conception of narrative 
ﬂ uctuate between relying on empirical observation on the one hand and speculative arguments 
on the other one. This notwithstanding, I believe that the point made in the previous paragraph 
still holds, namely the strong conception of narrative rests mainly on empirical observation 
rather than other kinds of arguments.
8  Although it is highly debatable whether causal mechanisms can do the job they are intended 
to do in the absence of narrative elements (Somers, 1998: 768-772).
Política y Sociedad
Vol. 53, Núm. 1 (2016):  79-99
Marcos Engelken-Jorge Narrative Deliberation?...
87
people can identify (Eder, 2006, 2007). By narrating their past, people provide their 
lives with a sense of continuity, thus giving rise to personal identities (Ricoeur, 1990). 
Social actors also produce understandings of past events by telling stories about them, 
which are then used to justify values (Joas, 2008: 91; 2011) and “moral universals” 
(Alexander, 2002). In all these cases, it is argued that by giving them narrative 
plausibility and motivating people to identify with them, stories create these social and 
symbolic phenomena. 
Thus the strong conception of narrative claims that there is no functional equivalent 
to storytelling when it comes to communication on topics such as the experience of 
time, values or identities, in the sense that with alternative forms of communication 
there would be a loss of meaning. This is a powerful observation. Essentially, it says 
that the debate between proponents of type I and type II deliberation, at least regarding 
whether storytelling should be accepted as part of deliberation, is ill-posed. Empirically, 
it is hard to imagine a public sphere devoid of narrative elements. From a normative 
perspective, it is doubtful that an ideal of deliberation that excluded narrative would 
be desirable, for it would not only rule out a speciﬁ c form of communication, but by 
doing so, it would also exclude certain arguments and ideas that can only be grasped 
in narrative form. For example, it would exclude recourse to speciﬁ c historical events 
or processes that can be recalled in order to strengthen an argument or even in order to 
make an argument. Precisely deliberative theory provides an example of the latter case, 
which is presented below. 
This strong conception of narrative is not necessarily incompatible with deliberative 
theory. Indeed, in the next sections of this paper I will embrace this conception and still 
argue for deliberative democracy as a prima facie valid and coherent political ideal. 
As suggested earlier, as long as storytelling does not erode the self-correcting dynamic 
of public deliberation, that is, as long as narratives can be criticised and revised for 
not getting the facts straight, being inconsistent or implausible, and so forth, the 
arguments for the epistemic dimension of deliberative democracy still hold. However, 
as interpreted by other authors, this strong idea of narrative undermines the epistemic 
argument for deliberative democracy. I will now turn to this interpretation.9
9  Apart from the ones that will be presented below, there are further objections against 
deliberative democracy that are linked to the concept of narrative. For instance, feminists have 
stressed storytelling’s contribution to the “facilitation of local publics and [the] articulation of 
collective afﬁ nities.” This is –they claim– a matter downplayed by deliberative democrats, which 
cannot be adequately addressed by a concept of deliberation narrowly conceived (Young, 2002: 
73). However, unlike the objections presented in the next section, this and similar criticisms 
are not so much aimed at undermining the theoretical foundations of deliberative democracy, 
but seek instead to broaden deliberative democracy’s ideal of public communication. For this 
reason, as well as due to space limitations, I will not consider these further objections in this 
paper.
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4. Arguments against Deliberative Democracy Derived
 from the Strong Conception of Narrative 
Famously, one author interpreting the strong conception of narrative in such a way as 
to undermine deliberative theory is Richard Rorty. Although Rorty (1989) does not 
so much speak of narratives or stories but of processes of “redescription,” narratives 
ﬁ gure prominently in his account, especially in the form of novels and other literary 
texts. They contribute to instituting “ﬁ nal vocabularies” which mediate our relation 
with the world, including ourselves and other persons as well as social groups. If the 
strong conception of narrative stresses the performative dimension of stories, in the 
sense that they are seen as contributing to creating things like personal and collective 
identities, one can say that Rorty goes a step further and argues that stories contribute 
to creating cognitive systems or ﬁ nal vocabularies. More recently, Finlayson (2012) 
has also stressed the poetic and performative capacity of language. One of his central 
arguments is that public controversies often centre not so much on arguments and the 
conclusions that follow from shared premises, but on the premises themselves. “What 
is at issue is the nature of the event or phenomenon [around which public controversies 
revolve], which is produced in its description and through the narrative context in 
which it is placed” (Finlayson, 2012: 762). To analyse these public disputes, one should 
focus, among other things, on the “range of ‘quasi-logical’ forms of argument” used, i.e. 
“attempts to produce in audiences conclusions taken to follow naturally from certain 
premises” (Finlayson, 2012: 761), as well as on the creative and “evangelic” character 
of communication, which shows and invents rather than “demonstrates” (Finlayson, 
2012: 762-763). What is implicit in Finlayson’s selection of words is made explicit by 
Rorty. In this regard, I would like to highlight three ideas.
First, for Rorty, as well as for others (e.g. Martin, 2002), beliefs hang together by 
webs of implications forming cognitive systems that vary historically and culturally. 
The crucial point is that these webs of implications do not reﬂ ect any intrinsic properties 
of beliefs, but are created and maintained by other means: a linguistic community, 
epistemic authorities, shared narratives, etc. This has implications for standards of 
rationality, which are seen as dependent upon these cognitive systems. For example, 
although nowadays it would seem utter nonsense, “[i]n the sixteenth century it was 
only rational to test astrophysical or biological theories against holy scripture” (Rorty, 
2007: 925; cf. Martin, 2002: 870-873).
Second, the fact that standards of rationality are context-speciﬁ c is taken to mean, 
from a logical perspective, that the scope of argumentation is very limited. That is, most 
of the time, what we ﬁ nd in public controversies are not instances of argumentation but 
of redescription: 
“The method is to redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have 
created a pattern of linguistic behavior … It does not pretend to have a better 
candidate for doing the same old things which we did when we spoke in the old way. 
Rather, it suggests that we might want to stop doing those things and do something 
else. But it does not argue for this suggestion on the basis of antecedent criteria 
common to the old and the new language games. For just insofar as the new language 
really is new, there will be no such criteria.” (Rorty, 1989: 9)
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For similar reasons, contextualists also tend to think of ethical and moral standards as 
culture-dependent. Again, Rorty provides a passage which is worth quoting at length: 
“Once, for example, it would have sounded crazy to describe homosexual 
sodomy as a touching expression of devotion, or to describe a woman manipulating 
the elements of the Eucharist as a ﬁ guration of the relation of the Virgin to her Son. 
But such descriptions are now acquiring popularity. At most times, it sounds crazy 
to describe the degradation and extirpation of helpless minorities as a puriﬁ cation 
of the moral and spiritual life of Europe. But at certain periods and places –under 
the Inquisition, during the Wars of Religion, under the Nazis– it did not.” (Rorty, 
1990a: 6)
From these ideas, a number of interconnected challenges follow for deliberative theory. 
I will simply mention them brieﬂ y: 
First, one can argue that many social conﬂ icts cannot be resolved by “rational” 
means. In the last instance, they are but clashes of ﬁ nal vocabularies which are 
incommensurable, there being no neutral ground to adjudicate between them – only 
further ﬁ nal vocabularies which are equally incommensurable. If, for example, human 
rights rest upon a previous process of “sacralisation” of the person (Joas, 2011), then 
there is no meaningful way of arguing for them unless our interlocutors share this same 
belief in the sacredness of individuals, that is, this same ﬁ nal vocabulary, which creates 
in the ﬁ rst instance the logical space where human rights arguments can ﬁ nd resonance. 
Second, in these cases, public arguments consist of instances of redescription, which 
are different from rational argumentation, as stated earlier.
Third, it can be argued that the epistemic justiﬁ cation of deliberative democracy is 
ethnocentric. Actually, given the strong contextualist arguments introduced earlier, any 
political ideal would probably be ethnocentric. In the case of deliberative democracy, 
it is unconvincing because it is based upon egalitarian and universalistic values which 
are not shared by everybody, but are rather grounded in culture-speciﬁ c narratives. 
Thus, integrating the (strong) conception of narratives into the theoretical ediﬁ ce of 
deliberative democracy would be akin to a Trojan horse; namely, it would severely 
undermine or restrict the epistemic account of deliberative democracy, which, as 
argued earlier, is seen by many deliberative democrats as crucial for any justiﬁ cation 
of deliberative democracy in the ﬁ rst place. Deliberative theorists would be forced 
to choose between giving up any epistemic justiﬁ cation of deliberative democracy –
which would compel them to ﬁ nd new ways of justifying this ideal or to abandon it 
altogether– and on the other hand, restricting to speciﬁ c cultural contexts the claim 
that deliberative democracy has an epistemic edge  –namely to those contexts in which 
the speciﬁ c interpretation of the liberal and egalitarian values upon which deliberative 
democracy is based is already widespread. For only people already sharing these 
values and the narratives upon which they are based could construe the outcomes of 
deliberative processes as epistemically superior, since only those people could see 
moral value in including all those affected by a political decision, in treating them as 
well as their interests equally, in allowing them to speak for themselves and showing 
respect for their moral autonomy, and so forth. 
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In the next section, I shall recall the shortcomings of the ﬁ rst two challenges, which 
have already been discussed at length elsewhere. To be sure, the third challenge has 
also already been tackled in the specialised literature. However, I will devote more 
attention to it to show that deliberative democratic theory itself has a historically 
speciﬁ c narrative grounding. 
5.  Meeting Some Objections
The aforementioned criticisms rest on shaky logical and conceptual grounds. Although 
from an epistemological perspective any strong contextualist position seems to be self-
defeating (Hatcher, 1994), it can be conceded that when it comes to practical questions, 
which involve ethical and moral considerations, these arguments gain more plausibility. 
However, even in this latter case, they have been criticised for several reasons. To begin 
with, the claim that ﬁ nal vocabularies are incommensurable seems to be implausible. 
“[T]he problem,” as stated by Bailin (2003: 7-8), “is that comprehension seems to 
presuppose continuity. If a new idea or practice emerged which were totally unconnected 
with any human traditions and practices, we would not be able to understand it.” 
Certainly, there might be cases of local incommensurability, that is, between competing 
values or between subsets of terms or language games (Oberheim, 2003), but it is hard 
to believe that two sets of ﬁ nal vocabularies are completely incommensurable, as this 
would impede any communication and understanding between them in the ﬁ rst place. 
A second criticism is related to contextualists’ misconception of argument. According 
to them, argument is opposed to redescription, which is creative and in a sense 
performative. Arguments should demonstrate rather than show or reveal (Finlayson, 
2012: 762), and they should be conclusive, amounting to a “knockdown answer” to 
a counter position (Rorty, 1990b: 636). They are, in sum, “algorithmic”, that is, they 
operate according to the rules and within the limits of a given ﬁ nal vocabulary (Bailin, 
2003: 12). The problem with this view, however, is that it is inappropriate to describe 
real arguments in everyday settings (Bailin, 2003: 12). First, arguments are creative 
–for instance, ﬁ nding counter examples and formulating new reasons for or against 
something entails some creativity. Second, they are usually non-deductive. In natural 
language, argumentation normally rests on ampliative arguments, that is, arguments the 
conclusions of which go beyond the premises and are therefore more or less probable 
or plausible, lacking deductive certainty (Bohman y Rehg, 2014). As understood by 
deliberative democrats and informal logicians, arguments simply provide reasons for or 
against something, without these reasons being deﬁ nitive or purely deductive. As such, 
the strict opposition between redescription and argumentation collapses. According to 
this account, then, showing how alternative forms of viewing things is more consistent 
with the available evidence or with someone’s values or beliefs –or showing how this 
alternative way of looking at things can realise or promote someone’s values to a greater 
extent– is not necessarily a mere instance of redescription, but can be considered an 
argument according to the way most deliberative democrats and informal logicians 
understand this concept. Certainly, sometimes redescription is just redescription, as 
when people talk past each other, framing and reframing a question without really 
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engaging the interlocutor. At other times, however, redescription can function as an 
argument –it says something along the lines of: ‘Look, with this way of looking at 
things you have these inconsistencies; but if you look from this perspective, these 
problems disappear.’ Indeed, this is one of the main arguments used by authors such as 
Luhmann (1984) or MacIntyre (1984) in support of their respective theories. 
Still, this does not solve the problem of value incommensurability. Two 
political positions might conﬂ ict because they happen to support two apparently 
incommensurable values  – i.e. values which have been “founded” on different sets of 
narratives that confer on them plausibility. The value of individual liberty, for example, 
might be brandished to defend the right to euthanasia, while opponents might wield 
the inviolability of human life. From a logical perspective, neither the fact that ﬁ nal 
vocabularies must overlap if communication is to be possible at all nor the revised 
concept of argument in line with its common function in everyday language use seem 
to eliminate these cases of value incommensurability.
Certainly, conﬂ icts of this kind reveal the limits of deliberation. The point, however, 
is that although one can concede that certain conﬂ icts cannot be resolved by the give 
and take of argument (or can hardly be resolved in this way), once the concept of 
incommensurability has been reduced to local incommensurability and the opposition 
between redescription and argumentation (as conceived by authors such as Rorty) has 
been discredited, value incommensurability no longer represents a purported sphere of 
human action which is void of communicative rationality, that is, which can be reduced 
to a mere clash of ﬁ nal vocabularies. Deliberation can contribute to clarifying the 
exact points of controversy (Miller, 2006: 129-156) and it can provide insight into why 
people disagree and hold the values that they happen to hold, thereby contributing to 
the decentring of one’s own perspective and to promoting forms of legitimate dissent, 
that is, dissent based on reasons which both parties understand and ﬁ nd reasonable 
although they weigh them differently (Dryzek and Neimeyer, 2006;10 Kock, 2007). In 
other words, value incommensurability is not the same as, nor does it presuppose, (full, 
i.e. non-local) logical incommensurability. 
6. Meeting the Objection of Ethnocentrism: The Narrative Justiﬁ cation of   
 Deliberative Democracy
I considered the aforementioned objections not only because the strong conception of 
narrative can be interpreted, as by Rorty and Finlayson, as challenging deliberative 
theory, but also because it provides insight into one aspect of the relation between 
deliberative democracy and storytelling that has largely been ignored thus far; namely, 
what can be called the narrative justiﬁ cation of deliberative democracy. 
In line with the strong conception of narrative, my contention is that it is meaningless 
to debate whether storytelling should be part of deliberation, since there is no functional 
10  To be sure, Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006) do not speak of legitimate dissent but of “meta-
consensus.” The latter, however, can be regarded as the other side of the coin of legitimate 
dissent (in this regard, see Kock, 2007).
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equivalent to narrative when it comes to communication about issues such as identities, 
values and the experience of time. To give some plausibility to this claim, I shall show 
that deliberative democracy itself has to rely on certain narratives to be defended as a 
political ideal. 
Earlier, a question was raised which I have not answered thus far, namely whether 
deliberative democracy is an ethnocentric ideal. The scholarly response to this challenge 
has consisted in embedding deliberative democracy in, ﬁ rst, a broader account of what 
constitutes intellectual and moral progress and second, in a historical (though stylised) 
narrative about cultural pluralism and its concomitant political challenges. The latter 
narrative has been provided by Habermas, while the former account of intellectual 
and moral progress has been developed by pragmatist philosophers (and Habermas 
himself), partly based on Kuhn’s account of scientiﬁ c progress. In line with my 
argument thus far, this historical and narrative justiﬁ cation of deliberative democracy 
does not provide a deﬁ nitive argument for this political ideal, but simply good reasons 
(although ultimately fallible ones) for embracing it. 
Famously, Kuhn’s account of scientiﬁ c progress is an evolutionary one in the 
sense that it regards scientiﬁ c development as moving away from the anomalies and 
dysfunctions of dominant theories, rather than moving towards some ﬁ xed goal (cf. 
Oberheim, 2013). Repeated failures to predict the occurrence of certain events, the 
inability of a theory to explain certain phenomena consistently, the identiﬁ cation of 
inner incoherencies, or its inadequacy to guide action and manipulate objects effectively 
can lead to the revision of a theory. Sticking to this fundamental insight and leaving 
aside other aspects of Kuhn’s theory, this evolutionary approach has been generalised 
and used to account for intellectual progress more generally. In this view, intellectual 
progress is triggered by irritations in our performative experience of reality, that is, 
it is brought about by our efforts to solve the problems that we encounter in coping 
with the world. Hence, problem solving (i.e. moving away from irritations), rather than 
gradually approaching “reality” (i.e. moving towards a ﬁ xed goal), is said to be the 
driver of intellectual progress11 (Habermas, 1999; Rorty, 2007; Roth, 2012; Sorrell, 
2013). 
This also applies to practical reason, concerned with the question of what we ought 
to do. Reﬂ ection on this question not only has to assess the efﬁ ciency of different means 
of achieving certain ends, but also has to take into account “the opposition of other 
social actors whose value orientations conﬂ ict with ours” (Habermas, 1999: 42). Be it 
in the short, medium or long term, this latter challenge can trigger learning processes 
and the decentralisation of one’s own perspective in order to understand these value 
conﬂ icts and respond to them in one way or another. At stake, then, is moral learning, 
that is, the “intelligent expansion and reciprocal interpenetration of social worlds that 
in a given case of conﬂ ict do not yet sufﬁ ciently overlap” (Habermas, 1999: 105). 
Academic discussion on moral relativism and universality is a case in point. Given 
11  In comparison to other spheres of human activity, which also produce knowledge, the 
speciﬁ city of scientiﬁ c knowledge is that it is based on the systematic generation of problems. 
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that practical conﬂ icts arise from the opposition of others, consensual agreements are 
often necessary to solve these problems, that is, to eliminate this opposition in the ﬁ rst 
instance, or at least make it manageable.12 Thus, what is required is that the “disputing 
parties learn to include one another in a world they construct together so as to be able to 
judge and consensually resolve controversial actions in the light of matching standards 
of evaluation” (Habermas, 1999: 105). Again, the expression “resolve [controversial 
actions]” should be understood in a broad sense, that is, as including arrangements 
which do not strictly speaking eliminate disagreement, such as granting rights like 
freedom of religion, but which make it simply manageable because they are based on 
a legitimate dissent (see the point on legitimate dissent above, as well as Habermas, 
1999: 227-228). 
This image of practical reason as a problem-solving activity is consistent with 
the more general account of intellectual progress as problem solving. In both cases, 
learning processes help us revise our cognitive structures with a view to overcoming 
problems that we experience performatively in our interaction with the world and 
with others. This does not mean that learning processes, when they occur,13 are always 
successful. However, although fallible, their prima facie validity stems from the fact 
that they have overcome the problems and shortcomings of the previously dominant 
cognitive structures, be it regarding practical questions or questions about the correct 
representation of the “objective” world, as in scientiﬁ c progress. 
With this account of intellectual progress in place, deliberative theory is able 
to respond to the challenge of ethnocentrism –and it does so by telling a story. 
Essentially, this story describes the evolution of moral beliefs to the present day, that 
is, how former self-evident and sacralised worldviews, which justiﬁ ed speciﬁ c social 
and political orders, have undergone a process of de-sacralisation, contestation and 
complexiﬁ cation that mirrors to some extent the inner differentiation, pluralisation 
and complexiﬁ cation of societies (Habermas, 1981: 64 ff., 1996: 11-64, 1999: 261-
266). One of the consequences of this process of modernisation –so the story goes– 
12  Certainly, one can argue that another alternative is the physical elimination of the other, 
which would also put an end to opposition. There are at least two possible answers to this 
objection. First, sticking to the conception of intellectual and moral progress as problem 
solving and trying not to take for granted any aprioristic moral commitments on the part of 
the conﬂ icting parties, one argument that can prioritise consensual agreement over physical 
confrontation is the observation that the latter usually seems to aggravate, rather than improve, 
social conﬂ icts. The problem with this argument, however, is that it makes morality depend on 
non-moral considerations, which would undermine its autonomy. This is a problem especially 
for Kantian philosophers. Another alternative, which avoids this difﬁ culty, is to argue that moral 
learning presupposes that people always already adopt a moral perspective, i.e. that they take 
as their reference point “an ideally projected social world of legitimately ordered interpersonal 
relationships” which they collectively have to deﬁ ne in each case and bring about (Habermas, 
1999: 261). 
13  Certainly, learning processes might be blocked, take pathological turns, or simply fail to 
change a situation signiﬁ cantly (in this regard, see Eder, 1991, 1999; Miller, 2006). 
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is that “more and more people [encounter] more and more others in other roles and 
different situations as less and less familiar counterparts: They encounter one another 
as strangers” (Habermas, 1999: 263) –hence, what political theorists since Rawls have 
called the fact of pluralism. This fact of pluralism has to be organised politically, not 
only within nation states, which are increasingly diverse, but also in the international 
arena (Apel, 2000). In such a situation, social actors can no longer rely on self-evident 
truths, but have to construct self-consciously their social and political orders together, 
but without recourse to substantive worldviews which are not shared by everybody. 
It is in this context that deliberative democracy can be justiﬁ ed. Essentially, what 
it claims is that notwithstanding the fact of pluralism, all human beings share in one 
form or another the capacity for language use and argumentation. Thus, social actors 
who can no longer rely on their cultural traditions to organise their coexistence might 
wish to explore whether their shared practices offer them enough normative elements 
through which to organise their living together (Habermas, 1996: 56-64; Stahl, 2013). 
Famously, Apel and Habermas have reconstructed the pragmatic assumptions that 
no-one in an argumentation can avoid making once they enter it: the sincerity of the 
speakers, the absence of coercion, the non-exclusion of relevant topics and perspectives, 
and so on. The point is that these are not assumptions speciﬁ c to ‘our’ (Western, 
European, academic, or whatever) conception of argumentation, but are constitutive of 
argumentation itself. In other words, if these assumptions are violated and this becomes 
obvious, we leave the game of argumentation and start a new one, whatever that is. At 
least this is the thesis put forward by Apel and Habermas, a thesis which has been very 
inﬂ uential among deliberative democrats. 
In this context, the egalitarian universalistic “bias” of deliberative democracy, 
which makes it appear ethnocentric, stems in the ﬁ rst place from the counterfactual 
assumptions of argumentation, not from a speciﬁ c cultural or moral tradition. “Lest 
the discussion of disputed validity claims forfeit its cognitive purpose, participants 
in argumentation must subscribe to an egalitarian universalism that is structurally 
mandated and that at ﬁ rst has only a formal-pragmatic, rather than a moral, meaning” 
(Habermas, 1999: 106). The proposal of deliberative democrats is, then, that we 
can organise our political systems in such a way that they approach these pragmatic 
assumptions of argumentation as closely as possible –given that these assumptions 
are universal, a political system based on them could in principle be recognised as 
legitimate by everybody. So, they argue, deliberative democracy is a plausible ideal 
with which to solve the problem of how to organise ourselves politically in a context 
marked by the fact of pluralism. Certainly, the ideal of deliberative democracy does not 
guarantee that we will be able to solve our practical disputes, but if this is still possible 
at all, public deliberation is the most appropriate means of doing so, given its epistemic 
edge and universal character. 
To summarise, this narrative describes our current political problems and contributes 
to justifying the prima facie validity of deliberative democracy by showing how it can 
help to respond to these historically speciﬁ c challenges. According to the account of 
intellectual progress presented earlier, deliberative democracy can be seen as the result 
of a learning process, i.e. as a prima facie valid response to the problem of how to 
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organise coexistence in a context characterised by a plurality of value orientations – 
hence, it can be seen as an instance of practical progress. If this historic justiﬁ cation 
of deliberative democracy is accepted, the arguments for the epistemic superiority of 
deliberation vis-à-vis other democratic procedures regain their validity, given that the 
egalitarian universalistic bias of deliberative democracy derives from the pragmatic 
presuppositions of discourse, the application of which to the realm of politics has 
been recognised as the result of a collective learning process, i.e. as a case of practical 
progress. 
Certainly, these are good but ultimately fallible reasons in support of deliberative 
democracy in the sense that they do not amount to a decisive, irrefutable justiﬁ cation 
of this political ideal. In any case, the exposition above illustrates a more humble point, 
which has, however, been overlooked by most discussions of the role of narrative and 
storytelling in deliberative democracy; namely, that deliberative theory itself cannot 
rely on argumentation devoid of narrative elements. They do not simply illustrate or 
make deliberative theory more colourful, but contribute to the very justiﬁ cation of this 
political ideal, that is, they are essential to articulate certain reasons in the ﬁ rst place. 
In line with the reading of the strong conception of narrative presented here, which 
ultimately grounds the sociocultural signiﬁ cance of narratives in empirical observation 
(rather than logical arguments or arguments of any other kind), the contention that 
deliberative theory also rests on narrative elements does not prove anything, but simply 
provides further evidence of the importance of narratives. In particular, it gives further 
plausibility to the claim that narratives are not only compatible with deliberation, but 
are even unavoidable, for without narratives some arguments could not be formulated 
in the ﬁ rst place. 
7. Conclusion and Future Research
In this article, I have concentrated on the debate about the legitimate or illegitimate 
place of storytelling in deliberation. I have distinguished between a weak concept 
of narrative, according to which narratives are just another rhetorical device among 
many that can be used (or not used) to convey meaning, and a strong conception, 
which sees narratives as an unavoidable feature of human communication, playing a 
fundamental role in the shaping of the symbolic and social world in which social actors 
live. Whilst the weak conception of narrative – the one that has usually been discussed 
by deliberative theorists –seems to be compatible with the theory of deliberative 
democracy, the strong conception, favoured by many social theorists and “postmodern” 
philosophers, has been interpreted as challenging some of the tenets of the epistemic 
justiﬁ cation of deliberative democracy. If these arguments were right, integrating 
the concept of storytelling into deliberative theory would be akin to a Trojan horse, 
that is, it would undermine the justiﬁ cation of deliberative democracy from within, 
so to speak. I have argued, however, that these criticisms rest on shaky conceptual 
and logical grounds. Furthermore, in line with the strong conception of narrative, I 
have contended that a plausible justiﬁ cation of deliberative democracy requires the use 
of narrative elements –a point usually overlooked by most discussions of the relation 
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between narratives and deliberation. With this, I have tried to strengthen the case that 
narratives are not only conceptually compatible with deliberative theory, but are also 
necessary to articulate certain arguments in the ﬁ rst place, that is, they are inevitably 
part and parcel of deliberation. 
This argument provides an answer to the question whether storytelling should be 
part of public deliberation, but in so doing, it leads to further issues, both normative and 
empirical. From a normative perspective, for instance, it would be necessary to clarify 
whether the use of narratives in public deliberation should be restricted to speciﬁ c 
cases – for example, to the telling of particular historical events or processes (however 
idealised), as in the example mentioned in the previous section. Furthermore, it should 
be elucidated whether special obligations apply to storytelling in some situations. For 
example, when it comes to stories about speciﬁ c social groups, it might be reasonable to 
demand from speakers that they clarify to what extent these stories can be generalised 
to speciﬁ c groups. Yet, these special obligations might conﬂ ict with the idea that 
storytelling favours inclusive deliberative practices. Empirical research, for its part, 
has provided some initial results concerning additional questions raised by this paper, 
although further evidence is needed. Some of these issues are: Are social actors more 
likely to use narratives when it comes to certain topics rather than others? Is storytelling 
likely to lead to different, possibly less confrontational, styles of deliberation (Polleta 
and Lee, 2006)? Are certain narrative genres better suited to public deliberation than 
others (Forchtner and Eder, forthcoming)? But these and further questions should be 
the topic of future research. 
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